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This paper shows parallelisms between the philosophies
of George H. Mead and Charles S. Peirce. Because they both
view cognition from the social realist's perspective, they
independently developed equivalent triadic theories of
meaning. It is further argued that their pragmatic account
of meaning logically leads to belief in the objectivity
and communality of truth and scientific knowledge. This
reveals their opposition to the nominalistic and individualis-
tic view of truth and knowledge sometimes embraced in contem-
porary sociology of knowledge.
In his introduction to Mead's Selected Writings, Andrew Reck (1964:x1iii)
observed that it is necessary to go back to Charles Peirce to find a speculative
genius, working from pragmatic principles, who equals the daring of Mead. lAS far
as I have been able to determine, regrettably few have taken that journey. Morris
(1938:110-111), in one of the better known attempts to relate the thoughts of
Peirce and Mead, noted that because Peirce approached his problems as a logician
while Mead approached his as a social psychologist, coupled with the fact that no
obvious influence of Peirce on Mead is discernible, their convergences and their
differences are more significant. Morris emphasized their differences more than
their convergences; consequently, in dwelling on their divergences, Morris might
lead one to overlook the similarities between their philosophies.
The purpose of this paper will be to reverse that focus because their con-
vergences are at least as instructive as their differences. Most sociologists
read Mead and ignore Peirce, and many philosophers do the opposite. This is
understandable, given Peirce's and Mead's difference in approach; however,
because their writings complement each other, one can, by seeing the same points
presented in a different way, broaden his 'understanding of Mead by reading Peirce
and vice versa.
Gallie (1966:31) suggests that Mead and others working in the pragmatic
tradition have been following, consciously or unconsciously, in the steps of
Peirce. The fact that Mead's writings virtually never referred to Peirce implies
that whatever influence Peirce had on Mead's thought must have been indirect and
unknown to Mead. It seems likely that much of this influence came through James.
Mead was James' student, and James and Peirce were life-long friends (Reck, 1964:
lviii).
I shall claim that, despite the clear differences stated by Morris, there
remain significant parallelisms between the philosophies of Peirce and Mead.
The analysis will center upon their views of truth, meaning, and scientific know-
ledge. Finally, these views will be related to the question of the relativity
of truth, raised by the sociology of knowledge. Specifically, it is a common
thesis of the sociology of knowledge that since one views the world within the con-
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fines of some particular Weltanschauung, he can never know that what appears as
truth within that framework (of which he is a prisoner) is the truth as it really
is. Consequently, all truth claims are relative to the socio-historical context
they presuppose and are meaningless outside that situation.
Signification is the communication of ideas. Peirce and Mead argue that
signification is possible only when both interactants attach the same meaning to
their symbols. This is a common sense observation, and yet the mere fact that men
are able to effectively communicate through signs and symbols carries with it
profound epistemological implications. Such communication requires that both
communicants share similar perceptual experiences; otherwise) it would be
impossible for them to consistently associate the same object to a common symbol.
This, in turn, implies that, since people of divergent social origins can
communicate effectively on a broad range of topics, they can agree upon per-
ceptual judgments (e.g., that the top of the desk is brown) even though they
may occupy radically different social positions. This shared basis for perceptual
judgments provides the foundation which makes language possible; furthermore, it
makes the scientific method possible and creates the objectivity of the sci·entific
perspective (see Mead, 1964:306-319). All of this may appear to be common sense,
but it is important to make it explicit whenever philosophers (for example, Winch,
1958) import philosophy's 'other minds' problem into sociology, thereby arguing
in favor of the a priori impossibility of nomothetic social science. Such
philosophers need to be reminded that although epistemology may call percepts
into question, science must necessarily postulate the reality of what is percept-
ually given. Equally important, if the thoughts of other minds could never be
inferred from what is given in perception, the skeptic, Peirce and Mead would
argue, could not give expression to his contentions because language is impossible
without having a community of minds capable of signifying the same object to each
other. This is the heart of the triadic theory of meaning shared by Peirce and
Mead.
Peirce developed the realist thesis further by contending that because the
scientific community bases its beliefs on perceptual judgments whose content is
beyond human control, it logically follows that the scientific community would,
if given an indefinite amount of time, reach complete consensus, and their beliefs
would be true without reservation. This final step in Peirce's argument against
relativism seems to leave Mead behind, though possibly not far behind.
The Problem of Meaning
Peirce and Mead took, as a common point of departure, the question: how is
language possible? While Peirce was concerned to lay bare the whole logical
substructure of symbolic communication, Mead was more crucially interested in the
social and psychological processes which mediate symbolic behavior. Consequently
in presenting Peirce, I shall limit myself to those aspects of his philosophy
which bear direct relevance to Mead's interests. This is necessary because,
although Peirce and Mead had many of the same insights, Peirce's theory of
meaning was far more developed conceptually and terminologically than Mead's
theories. 2
The foundation of3Peirce's philosophy was his logic, the formal doctrine of
signs. Peirce (2.228) stated that a sign is something which stands to somebody
for something in some respect or capacity. In a more detailed definition, he
(2.303) characterizes a sign as being "anything which determines something else
(its interpretant) to refer to an object to which itself refers (its object) in
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the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infinitum."
By this, Peirce meant that the interpreter's response to a sign is~irected
toward the same object as is th.e sign of which it is the interpretant.
This relation will be further amplified in a latter section, but let us con-
sider an example which, for illustrative purposes, is somewhat oversimplified. If
someone comments that it is about to rain, one hearing that statement might go
outside and raise the windows of his car. This action is the interpretant of the
sign (i.e., the statement that it is going to rain), and both the sign and inter-
pretant refer to the same object--namely, the existing atmospheric conditions.
Also, the action of raising the car's windows might cause another person to
notice the weather conditions. This demonstrates Peirce's principle that every
interpretant can serve as a sign having the same object as has the sign of which
it is the interpretant. Thus, in principle, the sign-interpretant chain may
proceed indefinitely.
As stated, the interpretant is the response of the interpreter to the sign
(5.475), or, as Mead (1934:78) notes, " .•. the response of one organism to
the gesture of another in any given social act is the meaning of that gesture."
Mead also realized the distinction between the object of the sign and the inter-
pretant of the sign. He observes that signification has a double reference, one
to the thing indicated (Peirce's 'object') and the other to the response (Peirce's
'interpretant') (Mead, 1964:246).
One of the problems of this doctrine is that if the sign-interpretant process
is conceived as being a continuing and indefinite progression (i.e., every sign,
by definition, must have an interpretant, and every interpretant must serve as a
sign for a subsequent interpretant), then the theory is incapable of explaining
the origins of 'consciousness' or 'mind' since Peirce's thought-sign and Mead's
significant symbol presuppose the existence of reflective intelligence. Peirce
and Mead were both aware of the problem. Peirce argued that the sign-interpretant
chain is analogous to a certain type of mathematical series which contains no
first term or last term. This defense seems inadequate since the sign-interpre-
tant process necessarily operates within the spatial and temporal limits of the
human condition whereas no such limits are involved in purely mathematical
sequences. Mead's solution is somewhat less dependent upon analogy.
According to Mead, gestures are distinguishable on the basis of whether they
require symbolic convention. Clearly, the human race existed long before people
developed the ability to communicate with significant symbols. Yet, as Mead
implies, humans did have the ability to communicate through more primitive
methods (non-significant gestures). Mead concludes that if we regard these
non-linguistic forms of communication as prior to the emergence of 'mind,' then
the development of reflective intelligence, by the human race, as well as by the
individual, can be explained in terms of a gradual movement from the "rudimentary
form" of social experience to understanding and communication through significant
symbols. Thus, the development of 'mind' or 'consciousness' can be seen as a
naturai stage in the evolution of the interaction process rather than as an
ontologically inexplicable presupposition of symbolic communication (Mead, 1934:50).
Actually, Peirce's logic implicitly contained all of the conceptual apparatus
necessary to give a full account of Mead's theory of the evolution of conscious-
ness. In order to develop this point, it will unfortunately be necessary to
re~ Lew some of Peirce's neologisms. Since signs involve a triadic relationship
between sign, object, and interpretant, it is possible to characterize a sign
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in three different ways:
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1. According to the nature of the sign itself.
2. According to th.e way the sign denotes its obj ec t ,
3. According to' the relationship between the sign and i.ts interpre-
tant. (Since these relations are purely logical and have no
direct relevance to Mead, they will not be analyzed.)
By the first of the trichotomies of signs (as Peirce called them), a sign
is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a legisign. A qualisign is a "quality which
is sign" (2.244). The feeling of any particular color is an example of a quali-
sign. A sinsign is "an actual event or existent thing which is a sign (2.245).
A sinsign can act as a sign only through its qualities; hence, sinsigns require
qua1isigns. However, these qualisigns have no significance individually, but
collectively function as a sign in virtue of being embodied in the same object
or event. For example, we identify a particular type of bird by attending to a
number of its qualities (size, color, shape) none of which may be individually
sufficient to signify that particular type of bird but which collectively have
that capacity. Finally, a legisign is a type of rule or law which can only
denote its object by means of some agreed upon convention; consequently, every
legisign can function only through what Peirce called its "replica": a special
type of sinsign which would not be significant "if it were not for the law which
renders it so" (2.246). Peirce cites the word "the" as an example of a legisign.
It can be employed through a variety of sinsigns (e.g., it can be spoken, printed,
carved in stone, et cetera). In any case, all of these sinsigns are replicas
of the same legisign and would be meaningless without their connection to it.
There exists, therefore, a hierarchy of dependence between legisigns,
sinsigns, and qualisigns since legisigns require sinsigns in order to denote
their objects and sinsigns require qualisigns. However, ordinary sinsigns and
qualisigns function as signs without recourse to legisigns. Primitive man
learned to recognize horses long before he developed legisigns; indeed, this
type of non-verbal experience is, as Mead (1934:50£f.) noted, a prerequisite
to the emergence of language.
Peirce's second trichotomy (icon, index, symbol) affords a further indica-
tion of the distinction between verbal and non-verbal modes of signification.
As was noted, the first trichotomy characterized signs simply on the basis of
their form of appearance. The second trichotomy distinguishes signs according to
the means by which they refer to their objects. "An icon is a sign which refers
to the object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own ... "
(2.247). Thus, an icon acts as a sign simply because its qualities resemble its
object. For example, a portrait is an icon of the person it represents. Note
that the sign-object relation of resemblance exists even if no interpreter per-
ceives i~ as such, but of course the icon can only function as a sign when it is
interpreted as denoting its object.
A second type of sign-object relation is the index, which Peirce defines as
"a sign which refers to the object that it denotes by virtue of being really
affected by that object" (2.248). that is, there is an actual physical connection
between an index and its object. Peirce gives the example of a weathervane, which
is an index because there is a direct physical relation between the direction the
weathervane points and the direction that the wind is blowing (2.286). Another
example of an index is a rap on the door since there is a causal connection between
the knock on the door (the index) and the presence of someone outside (its object).
Again, notice that, like the icon, the index's sign-object relation exists even
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though it may not be interpreted.
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The third type of sign of the second trichotomy is the symbol, which Peirce
(2.249) describes as a sign which "refers to the object that it denotes by
virtue of a law, usually an association of general ideas, which operates to
cause the symbol to be interpreted as referring to that object." It is the
counterpart of the legisign. Thus, a word denotes its object simply by virtue
of its agreed upon identification with it. Consequently, the symbol, unlike the
index or icon, requires an interpretant; otherwise, it not only fails to be a
sign, it also has no object. As Mead (1934:181) writes, "A symbol is nothing but
the stimulus whose response is given in advance." The capacity to compel the
interpreter to respond to its object is the distinguishing mark of the symbol.
From this, it is clear that of the icon, index, and symbol, only the symbol
presumes language. This again suggests the hypothesis that man may have developed
the capacity for reflective thought (and, hence, the significant symbol) only
after experiencing the more "rudimentary forms" of the social process through icons
(e.g., hieroglyphics) and indices (e.g., facial and bodily gestures) (cf. 2.338).
Mead never tired of insisting that the self is not given antecedent to all
experience, but rather that it emerges from the initial stages of interaction in
the social process. It is only when one can recognize an external object ~
external that it becomes possible to represent objects to himself. As Peirce
(1.324) likewise recognized, "We become aware of ourself in becoming aware of
the not-self."
It is unfortunate that Peirce never extended the elements of his logic in a
more completed theory of the emergence of consciousness as did Mead. Perhaps, as
Morris (1938:110-111) noted, it was Peirce's preoccupation with logic and Mead's
stress on social psychology which caused them to pursue different implications of
their basically shared analysis of meaning structures.
Truth, Community, and Science
Peirce and Mead agreed that signification occurs only when each interactant
attaches the same meaning to every symbol and that this requires a language
community. Thus, the object of a sign or significant symbol is necessarily open
to public agreement. These considerations led Peirce to the conclusion that
since the determination of scientific knowledge involves propositions, it must also
be a communal action. Furthermore, because science is a pragmatic and communal
practice, the ultimate beliefs of the scientific community would necessarily be
true. Although Mead did not share Peirce's boundless optimism in the potential of
science, he did agree that truth and knowledge are inextricably bound to the
notion of community--with many of the same consequences seen by Peirce.
One can approach their conception of the role of community in science and
knowledge by analyzing what Peirce would call the interpretants of a sign or what
Mead would term the response of the second organism to the gesture of the first.
Peirce divided the interpretant into four elements: the emotional interpretant,
the energetic interpretant, the logical interpretant, and the ultimate logical
interpretant. As I will show, although Mead was not as systematic as Peirce, he
did recognize these distinctions.
As noted, the interpretant is the response of the interpreter to a sign, but
upon closer examination, it can be seen to have a number of possible components.
The emotional interpretant is "a feeling which we come to interpret as evidence
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that we comprehend the proper effect of the sign ..• " (5.475). Peirce adds that
in some cases such as a musical performance, the emotional interpretant is the only
"proper significant effect" produced by the sign. Mead (1934:75) makes essen-
tially the same point by referring to poetry as an illustration of the fl •••
difference between the purely intellectual character of a symbol and its emotional
character." If the sign is to produce any effect other than the emotional inter-
pretant, it can only do so through some effort of the interpreter. This energetic
interpretant, as Peirce called it, may simply consist of muscular responses such
as "clenching of fists, grinding of teeth, •.• or else outflows of nervous
energyf1 (Mead, 1964:109). However, the effort of the energetic interpretant is more
often mental than physical. This mental effort may produce what Peirce (5.476)
called the logical interpretant, which is "closely related" to the meaning of a
general concept. For example, if upon hearing thunder, one thinks of rain, that
thought is the logical interpretant of the sign (thunder). Yet many times we do
not consciously think about the sign--especially if it is quite familiar and
expected. Mead (1934:72) tells the story of the absent-minded college professor
who started to dress for dinner, but finally found himself in his pajamas in bed
because H ••• he did not think about what he was doing. The later action was
not a stimulus to his res~onse but just carried itself out when it was once
started." [emphasis mineJ The logical interpretant can only occur when one con-
ceptualizes the potential consequences of the sign. "The meaning can appear only
in imagining the consequences of the gesture" (Mead, 1964:111).
But the thought which is the logical interpretant cannot be the last effect
produced by the sign because the logical interpretant is "a single act," but the
intellectual concept with which it is closely reflected is 1I0 f a general nature"
(5.475; 5.467). Mead (1964:245) likewise writes that " ... signification is not
confined to the particular situation within which an indication is given. It
acquires universal meaning." One source of this generality of reference in con-
cepts is that signification " ••• takes pl~ce through the individual generali-
zing himself in the attitude of the other," or, when the concept is represented
to oneself rather than another, its indication occurs through the interplay of
the 'I' and the 'me.'
There is another and perhaps more fundamental explanation of the general
nature of intellectual concepts. Most signs one encounters are perceptual objects.
We relate to physical objects in our environment nearly all of the time that we
are awake. Because we experience millions of percepts, we are only rarely aware
of the inferential character of perception. Peirce (2.141) states that percepts
are "mental constructions, not the first impressions of sense", and, consequently,
we know them "inferentially and most imperfectly." We perceive in terms of
categories created out of past experience; that is, to perceive an object in the
environment as being an 'x' is to perceive it as having the sensible qualities
remembered as characteristic of an 'x.' This inference usually functions as a
conditioned subconscious response component in perception. We only become con-
scious of this element when perceiving an unfamiliar object or event. For
example, when one notices a rare bird, he probably first perceives a bird (in the
generalized sense), but later perceives it as a bird of a specific type. Again,
Mead is very close to Peirce on this point. He writes, "A physical object or
percept is a construct in which the sensuous stimulation is merged with imagery
which comes from past experience" (1964:134).
The meaning of a concept is, therefore, constituted by all that one has
learned to associate with its object. This Peirce (5.491) called the ultimate
logical interpretant:
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The deliberately formed, self-analyzing habit---self-analyzing
because formed by the aid of analysis of the exercises that
nourished it--- is the living definition, the veritable and
final logical interpretant. Consequently, the most perfect
account of a concept that words can convey will consist in a
description of the habit which that concept is calculated to pro-
duce.
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Mead seems to follow Peirce very closely in the assertion that the final
interpretant consists of one's habits of response toward the object of the con-
cept. "The general habit of reacting to objects of a certain class, such as a
book, must be got before the mind's eye before a recognition of the meaning of
a book can appear. .. Furthermore the contents in consciousness which answer
to the meaning of objects are our generalized habitual responses to them" (Mead,
1964:129). Mead cites an example that is very illustrative because it clearly
displays Peirce's four elements of the interpretant. When someone observes the
footprint of a bear in the snow, the footprint is a sign (more technically, it
is an index), and the bear is its object. The person's response (interpretant)
consists of a feeling of fear (emotional interpretant) along with various physio-
logical changes (energetic interpretant). At the same time, there is the thought
of a bear (the logical interpretant) or, as Mead succinctly puts it, "The foot-
print means a bear." The person then runs away, furthers the hunt, or performs
Some other action consistent with his set of behavioral habits toward bears
under the conditions he perceives, and the habit which this experience creates or
strengthens is the ultimate logical interpretant of the concept 'bear' (cf. Mead,
1934:121).
From this pragmatic theory of meaning, both Peirce and Mead went on to
develop a correspondingly pragmatic definition of truth quite unlike that of some
other pragmatists, particularly James and Schiller. Peirce (5.552) remarked,
"Mr. Ferdinand C. S. Schiller informs us that he and James have made up their
minds that the true is simply the satisfactory. No doubt, but to say 'satisfactory'
is not to complete any predicate whatever. Satisfactory to what end?"
To define truth in such a way makes its determination dependent upon human
values. On this account, truth may ultimately depend upon the values of any
organized group which has sufficient social and political power to enforce con-
sensus on those values (cf. Huber, 1972; Mead, 1964:328). Peirce, horrified by
such prospects, desired to rest truth upon a reality "independent of the vagaries
of you and me." Such a reality must be a world which exists independent of mind
and which has the capacity to compel our sensations to take a particular form.
Our perceptual judgments, according to Peirce, answer to this condition. We
cannot voluntarily control the contents of perception (e.g., we cannot see as blue
an object which appears red).
Mead's philosophy of science is also based on this premise. Feyerabend and
other recent philosophers of science contend that competing scientific theories
may be, and sometimes are, "incommensurable." That is, each theory presumes a
different vocabulary by which experimental observations are described, and these
vocabularies rest upon mutually exclusive epistemological postulates. Conse-
quently, it is impossible to translate from one theory to the other; therefore,
one cannot rationally evaluate them in terms of how closely they approximate the
truth. This, of course, would return us to the thesis that truth is relative and
subjective. Although two scientists observe through different theories, Mead holds
that there remains a core content to their perceptions which make cumulative
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science possible. He observes,
For each there was a different world that was there, but in these
worlds there were actual or identical observations of individuals
which connect these worlds with one another and enable the latter
thinker to take up into his own the worlds that have preceded his.
The common content of these observations, by means of which
different worlds are strung together in human history, depends
upon the assumption that different individuals have had or would
have the same experiences (Mead, 1950:61-62).
This core consists in what Peirce (5.157) called 'perceptual judgrnents'---judg-
ment absolutely forced upon my acceptance, and that by a process which I am
utterly unable to control and consequently unable to criticize." Hence, these
judgments form the ultimate basis for all factual beliefs. Peirce held that the
truth of a factual proposition consists in a correspondence between the sign
which is the subject of the proposition and the predicate which is its object.
To state the relation more accurately, albeit confusingly, truth is the corres-
pondence of the asserted correspondence between the subject and predicate of a
proposition to the actual state of affairs (its object) which the proposition
purports to represent. This seems to be the type of relation Peirce had in mind
when he emphatically uttered, "Truth is the conformity of a representamen [sign]
to its object, its object, ITS object, mind you" (5.554). Mead (1964:339) made
an equivalent claim:
Having anatomized reality into relata and the relations, truth of the
judgment is found in a correlation between these and the cognitions
which answer to them in the mind. We find a new set of relations
and relata, that lying between things and the awareness of the mind.
If these relations offer the same pattern of structure as that which
they answer to in nature, we have the test of the truth of the logical
pattern as it appears in the judgment.
An understanding of the analysis of truth defended by Peirce and Mead is
necessary in order to grasp their view of the nature and purpose of scientific
inquiry, They held that the quest for scientific knowledge begins when one
experiences doubt and ends when one establishes belief through experimentation.
Peirce notes, "The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the
struggle to attain belief. • . . With the doubt, therefore, the struggle begins,
and with the cessation of doubt it ends" (5.375). Thus, Peirce maintains that
the purpose of science is to replace doubt with belief. One might object that it
is not belief which science seeks, but true belief. Peirce counters that such a
position is groundless because once belief is established on any question we are
entirely satisfied regardless whether that belief is true or false. "When doubt
ceases, mental action on the subject comes to an end; and, if it did go on, it
would be without a purpose" (5.376). Peirce adds that it might be granted that
we seek beliefs which we "think to be true" (5.375), but this is a simple tauto-
logy because we think all of our beliefs to be true. We may recall that Peirce
contended that the preferred method of establishing beliefs is the scientific
method because it determines our beliefs by perceptual judgments, and our thinking
has no effect upon the content or permanency of these judgments. Or~ as Peirce
(5.384) noted:
There are Real things [which] affect our senses according to regular
laws, and, through our sensations are as different as are our
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relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of
perception, we can ascertain how things really and truly are.
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Mead's view of the purpose and course of scientific inquiry is, in some
important respects, quite similar to Peirce's. First, he insists that inquiry,
necessarily begins with doubt and continues for the sole purpose of resolving
conflicting hypotheses. "Thinking .•. is always the solution of a problem"
(1964:129). And again, "[Judgment] ••• does not attain truth until experience
can proceed where it was inhibited" (1964:338). Finally, "The test of truth
which I have presented is the ongoing of conduct, which has been stopped by a
conflict of meaning•.• " (1964:328). Mead also agreed with Peirce that
scientific method must rest upon perceptual judgments and that such a method
fl ••• can only be applied where a reality which is not called into question
sets the conditions to which any hypothetical solution must conform' (1964:333).
Third, Mead wholeheartedly accepted Peirce's 'fa11iba1ism' -- the position that
no factual proposition can be known with absolute certainty (cf. 1.152f£). For
example, Mead cautions that "there is no such thing as Truth at large ... nor
does the scientist ..• endow his data with the logical form of such final
meanings" (1964:325).
However, Mead's fallibalism arises from a different source than does
Peirce's, and this difference reveals what seems to be a point of divergence
between Peirce and Mead on the question of the relativity of truth. As previously
quoted passages suggest, Mead identified truth with the solution of a problem--
an inner conflict between behaviorial dispositions (cf. 1964:129-130). He clearly
stated, "Truth is then synonymous with the solution of a problem" (1964:328).
Obviously, since there can be no such thing as a problem in general, there can
be no truth in general given Mead's definition of truth. All truth, then, must
be relative to a specific problematic context. This leaves open a serious
ambiguity. It fails to specify any temporal requirements that a problem
solution must meet in order to be called true. Certainly Newtonian physics
allowed conduct to proceed in an 'uninhibited' manner for many years. Yet we
certainly would not say that it is true or even that it was true. Using Mead's
truth formula, one might be forced to hold that it was true until its practice
was seen to create problems. But this states the relation backwards. Newtonian
physics created problems because it was (in part) false rather than, being false,
because it created problems. In other words, its falsity was not constituted by
the fact that it created problems, but rather, it created problems as a conse-
quence of its falsity. A similar line of reasoning can, of course, be applied to
true propositions and their consequences.
If Mead is given a more sympathetic interpretation or if we assume that he
was simply confused, the above criticism can be avoided without giving up the
notion that the doubt-belief dialectic is the prime mover of science. Such an
interpretation would construe the problem solution as the test of true propositions
rather than as the defining feature of them and would re-establish, as the
definition of truth, the correspondence of a propositional sign to its object.
This would bring us closer to Peirce's position. For Peirce, the existence of
an ongoing community is as crucial to the establishment of truth as it is to the
development of symbols. Individually, we are all subject to a multitude of
idiosyncrasies which may interfere with assuming the objectivity of the idealized
scientific observer. To a lesser extent, the whole scientific community at any
particular time is itself influenced by the social and political pressures of
the times, and, consequently, its activities and findings reflect somewhat the
interests represented by those pressures. Peirce held that science can therefore
discover truth only if we assume the scientific community to be extended
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indefinitely into the future, thereby transcending the limitations of composition
and spatia-temporal location. Peitce believed that, given this notion of the
extended community, science would necessarily discover truth. This derives from
the self-correcting method of subjecting hypotheses to the test of perceptual
judgments. Since perceptual judgments are independent of human opinion, Peirce
felt that, if science persists indefinitely in its method, it will be led
inexorably toward truth; therefore, the beliefs which the scientific community
would ultimately hold must be true. Conversely, any proposition which is false
must ultimately come into conflict with perceptual judgment) and this would
cause the scientific community to cease believing it. In the short run, we can
never know any proposition about the world with certainty because, as Hume would
remind us, it is always conGeivab1y possible that future experience will prove it
false (cf. 5.311). Peirce admits that there is no reason to suppose that the
community will continue forever, but "there is nothing in the facts to forbid our
having a hope, or calm and cheerful wish, that the community may last beyond any
assignable date" (2.654). It can be added that, even if Peirce's wish is
destined to go unfulfilled, that out come would have no bearing on his identifica-
tion of the real with the scientific community's ultimate beliefs because that
argument is expressed in conditional terms. 5
Although Mead apparently never identified reality with the beliefs of a
projected community, he did share Peirce's belief that science and scientific
knowledge are necessarily communal: " ..• I shall claim that the analysis of
experimental science • • • never operates in a mind or an experience that is not
social" (1964:53). And again, "In the field of any social science the objective
data are those experiences of the individuals in which they take the attitude of
the community•.. " (1964:310). He also suggests that it is its experimental
method that accounts for the universality of the perspective of the scientific
community. There is even some indication that he shared the Peircean thesis that
there is no truth which is, in principle, unknowable. For example, he declared
If ••• there is no nature that can be closed to mind" (1964:310-311).
Conclusion
One can summarize that Peirce and Mead were united in their opposition to the
epistemological individualism, popularized in modern philosophy by Descartes,
which reduces the epistemic relation to a dualistic association between a
socially isolated mind and its sensations. Peirce and Mead contend that this
obfuscates the fact that meanings develop and function in the social context of
past experience and future expectations. This renders them analyzable only in
terms of a triadic relation between a symbol, object signified, and the socially
objectified response to it. Moreover, since meaning necessarily involves
community, knowledge and truth, being propositional, must also be the object of a
community rather than of insulated individuals. Peirce pushes the position further
by arguing that although the beliefs of the scientific community are fallible in
the short run, its method ensures that, given the extension of the community
indefinitely into the future, the community would reach consensus, and those
beliefs would be the truth. There seems to be little evidence that Mead reached
Peirce's conclusion, but there is ample indication that he did (inconsistently)
support Peirce's premises. It is indeed clear that Peirce's pragmatic doctrine of
truth and meaning can provide much of the foundation for Mead's social psychology.
Unfortunately, Peirce is only beginning to receive recognition for his profound
contributions.
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*1 am indebted to Joan Huber for her valuable comments on earlier drafts of this
paper.
lRosenthal's (1969) essay is one of the more noteworthy exceptions, and there
may be others which my efforts have failed to locate.
2For example, Peirce developed ten basic classes of signs (with such forbidding
names as Rhematic Indexical Legisign) which he later expanded to sixty-six. These
classifications become redundant and therefore add little to the original
divisions.
3Th i s reference is to Volume II, paragraph 228 of the Collected Papers of Charles
Sanders Peirce. All references to Peirce will be in this format, following the
style of the editors.
4peirce, incidentally, antedated Mead on the notion of the 'generalized other'
which he termed 'retroconsciousness' (5.586).
5Ther e are, however, a number of possible objections to Peirce's arguments. I
will not develop them here. By the 1890's, Peirce became aware of these defects,
and made substantial changes in his position.
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